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ABSTRACT
The use of End-User Computing (EUC) in the Marine Corps has increased
dramatically in recent years. As Marine Corps-sponsored programs progressed, large
General Services Administration (GSA) contracts were established which made it
relatively easy for government agencies to acquire microcomputers.
A strongly centralized strategy, successful in the mpnagement of the Marine Corps
mainframe systems, was adopted for the EUC program. This thesis concludes that the
centralized strategy embraced by the Marine Corps is inappropriate to contend with the
problems faced at the end-user level. End-users must be made an active part of the EUC
process for lasting success. More importantly, current inadequacies in support and
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
Estimates have been made that End-User Computing (EUC) accounted for 40
percent of computer processing capacity in 1980, and will reach a projected 75 percent
bv I o90 (Brown. 1972. p. 1). Additionally, the growth rate in EUC-ielated areas has been
as much as five times higher than "conventional systems" (Gerrity and Rockart, 1986.
p. 25) The meaning of this drastic increase in EUC is that more and more people at all
, trati of organizations are becoming involved in computing. It's against this backdrop
that the EUC effort in the United States Marine Corps is presented.
B. MOTIVATION TO INCREASE END-USER COMPUTING IN THE MARINE
CORPS
The use of computer and data communications technology to manage information
in support of the Marine Corps has increased exponentially in recent years (MCBul 5271.
1989 p.4 -10). The Marine Corps in particular has much to gain from the efficient.
effective use of automated data processing (ADP) throughout the organization.
Traditionally the smallest force in the Department of Defense, the Marine Corps has a
tradition of doing "more with less". Everyone must be capable of performing not only
his or her job, but also that of fellow Marines. This applies to combat situations as well
as the administrative area of the Marine Corps. Until a few years ago, the steady increase
in administrative requirements generated by upper echelons was causing a serious drain
on training time for actual combat skills in Fleet Maiine Force (FMF) units. A typical
"repurts required" list for a squadron would include monthly, quarterly, and annual reports
to the squadron's parent group, aviation wing, and Fleet Marine Force (FMF)
headquarters.
In late 1985, however, a conccied effort began at the highest levels in the Marine
Corps to lessen the administrative burden in the FMF.
In recent efforts to reduce the administrative burden on the FMF, such as ALMAR
27(,185 and ALMAR 177/86, the Commandant has emphasized the primacy of
combat readiness. The Commandant stated "our most important peacetime objective
is to achieve the combat capability to win any future battle. That objective must
he emphasized by placing peacetime duties in proper perspective and ensuring that
administrative functions are justified only to the degree that they contribute to FMF
readiness." This emphasis on the primacy of combat readiness must be applied to
the development of IS's that directly support the FMF. (MCBul 5271, 1989, p.4-
Such overt statements have helped to identify the role of ADP in the Marine Corps.
The question that remains, and which this thesis investigates is, "Has the intent of
this ADP policy become a reality to the unit level Marines for whom it was intended?"
As early as 1981. Marines were questioning whether computers were serving Marines, or
vice versa (Anthony, 1981, p.18). Were these the grumblings of a few people resistant
to change, or were they the beginning of deep-seated dissatisfaction with EUC in the
FMF?
C. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES
The purpose of this thesis is to examine EUC in one segment of the Marine Corps.
At a time when systems and applications are being designed for the end-user, there
appears to be a lack of effort directed at examining the needs of those end-users who
probably most require help but are least able to articulate that need. This thesis attempts
to evaluate the effects of the Marine Corps' EUC strategy on the small unit. Current and
future strategic planning are presented and evaluated from the standpoint of its impact on
the small unit. Finally, recommendations are made to help foster and guide EUC at the
small unit level. Three sources of information have been used in this study: (I) a
literature search of planning models and analyses of EUC which were used to evaluate
Marine Co-ps EUC strategies identified in the other two sources. (2) Marine Corps
publications and documents, and (3), interviews with field units at the lower echelons.
1. Research Questions
The following questions guided the research approach of this thesis:
" What is the stated strategy for end-user computing development within the Marine
Corps?
" Does the Marine Corps' main information resource management planning document
(the Mid-Range Information Systems Plan) accurately depict the current EUC
situation at the small unit level?
" Does the current Marine Corps EUC strategy provide for effective growth at the
small unit level?
" How do current EUC conditions at the small unit level in the Marine Corps
compare to models found in the literature?
" Is the current EUC organizational structure within the Marine Corps adequate to
meet the needs of users throughout the Marine Corps?
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" How are end-users at the small unit level trained and supported?
" How can users be better trained?
" What changes should be made in strategy (and) structure to facilitate effective EUC
utilization in the Marine Corps?
D. SCOPE AND ANALYSIS LEVEL
End-User Computing (EUC) is a broad term, connoting many different levels of
technology and user interaction. EUC can occur anywhere there is a person who has
access to a computer (usually a personal or micro-computer). Bearing this in mind, the
specific segment of analysis needs to be carefully defined. Figure 1 illustrates a matrix
depicting two of the different factors which can affect EUC. Along one side lies the
specific organization in which the analysis is to be performed. This recognizes the unique
OrganIzatIo n
Ma rrage m Sn
LOvgO
Techno ogy of Orgar.zation
Figure 1. Factors Influencing EUC
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teffect of the organization relative to industry-wide EUC maturity. The second side of the
matrix represents the organizational stratum. Different levels of an organization have
different administrative and information requirements. These differences translate into
a need for varied types of computer assistance.
Because of the vast size of the United States Marine Corps, this study will be more
narrowly defined to focus on the squadron level of the aviation branch within the Marine
Corps.
E. ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS
In specifying one tactical arm of the Marine Corps for detailed study, the potential
information from other arms is being placed aside. The information vis a vis the aviation
community is still extremely useful since it constitutes a major combat arm in the Marine
Corps.
On-site interviews of Marines were limited due to the size of the project and
operational commitments of the units involved. The primary means of interview was by
telephone with written follow-ups. An exhaustive polling was not conducted, but
representative units from two of the three Regular Marine Aircraft Wings were
interviewed.
F. A WORKING DEFINITION OF END-USER COMPUTING
End-user computing will be defined in this thesis as an activity where an individual
or group of users who are not data-processing professionals use computers (usually
desktop microcomputers) for jobs, or applications, of their own design.
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G. THESIS ORGANIZATION
The paper is presented in four main parts. In Chapter Two, EUC in the Marine
Corps is described. An historical background of EUC is presented, followed by a
description of the organization currently used in the Marine Corps. In Chapter Three
theoretical models used to describe the growth and strategic implications of EUC are
presented. Chapter Four presents the stated strategy of the Marine Corps towards EUC
and places it within the frameworks of the theoretical models that were presented in
Chapter Three. Analysis of the effectiveness of the Marine Corps' strategy is evaluated
by using Marine Corps source material as well as interviews with end-users in the Marine
Corps. These interviews come chiefly from those individuals from the Fleet Marine
Forces, particularly at the squadron and Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) level. Chapter
Five provides conclusions and recommendations.
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U. END-USER COMPUTING ENVIRONMENT IN THE MARINE CORPS
A. INTRODUCTION
To be able to draw conclusions on EUC in the Marine Corps, the environment and
framework must first be known. This chapter highlights the history of the factors
influencing EUC in the Marine Corps, including contractual efforts to bring
microcomputers into mainstream Marine Corps use. The background and development
of two major projects, ADPE-FMF (the "Green Machine") project and its follow-on FMF-




In July of 1982 the Deputy Administrator of the General Services
Administration (GSA) determined that the burgeoning personal computer population in
the United States would bring untold management challenges. Consequently, he
authorized a series of discussions, which resulted in a comprehensive document on the
potential impact of EUC in the federal government, "Managing End-User Computing in
the Federal Government." (GSA,1983,pp.i-ii)
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a. "Managing EUC in the Federal Government"
"Managing End-User Computing in the Federal Government" is a far-
sighted document, demonstrating that members of GSA recognized that vast changes were
occurring in the way information resources were being utilized in all sectors. Overt
choices needed to be made regarding EUC: either EUC could be ignored via moratoria
on procurement of personal computers (in the hope that it would "go away"), or it could
be addressed in a positive, proactive manner. The GSA report stated that the government
should proceed "...with the knowledge at our disposal, however imperfect and whatever
it- Iritations. We need to proceed and profit from our mistakes as the basis for better
management decisions later." (GSA, 1983, p.3)
The paper highlighted the advantages of EUC, and also the challenges that
it presented to all levels of management. Perhaps most importantly, however, the GSA
document underscored the need for a strategic, proactive approach to end-user computing
in the federal government. It made the leap from theoretical to practical by presenting
a new program, called the "Managed Innovation Program." (GSA,1983,p.19) This
program sought to advance EUC by performing two types of actions. The first type
concerned direct management initiatives in cases where the problem was understood well
enough that government-wide action could be taken. Planned action included developing
a fact finding facility for GSA, developing a buyer's guide tor personal computers,
revising regulations and guidelines, and developing condensed procedures concerning
ADP. As part of "streamlining the bureaucracy" in administration, personal computer
procurement simplification was given a high priority.
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GSA plans to implement a new approach for the acquisition of personal computers.
The objective is to obtain discounts from aggregate purchases on a government-
wide basis. In the spring of iL83, GSA will pilot test a schedule similar to the
Teleprocessing Services Program (TSP) in which aggregate purchases are arranged
with a number of microcomputer vendors and associated software suppliers. (GSA,
1983. p.21)
In the second t-pe of action, the GSA report proposed to perform an end-user computer
pilot project. Under this pilot project up to 50 personal computers would be obtained
strictly for experimental purposes. As well as developing new applications, it was hoped
that the project would provide insight into the type of management changes that would
be required to effectively nurture EUC.
The impact of this paper upon Marine Corps attitudes toward EUC was
substantial. Just over a year after the publication of the GSA document the Marine Corps
presented its first draft publication of end-user computing guidelines. This document, the
"United States Marine Corps End-User Computing Guidelines", acknowledged the impact
of the GSA report when it stated "This recognition by GSA of general purpose
microcomputers has led to the creation of a program known as End-User Computing
(EUC) by both GSA and Department of Defense (DOD). (CMC 5230/CCIS-43,1984,p. 1)
b. "Marine Corps End-User Computing Guidelines"
The draft proposal for Marine Corps EUC guidelines was published under
the signature of Brigadier General P.D. Slack, the Director of the Marine Corps' C4
Systems Division. In his document he enthusiastically supported the concept of EUC to
increase productivity "...by means other than hiring additional personnel." (CMC
5230/CCIS-43,1984,p.1) The tone of the document reflected its influence by the earlier
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GSA publication. The overall goals and objectives of the EUC guidelines were to clarify
management responsibilities and initialpolicies (emphasis by author), facilitate acquisition
and use of EUC technology, prompt education efforts, and ensure that, as much as
possible, EUC practices and programs complied with existing directives. The document
then went on to provide general guidance in all areas of EUC, including planning,
requirements documentation, acquisition, security, and education/training. Although the
document was largely an empty "shell", it provided an architecture for further
development that is remarkably consistent with current formats.
As a result of these two guidelines, the EUC program in the Marine Corps was
definitely on its way. By October of 1984 the Marine Corps' ADPE-FMF project was
almost three years old. ADPE-FMF, although it can scarcely be considered actual EUC,
raised the consciousness of the average Marine about the existence of the personal
computer. Under the contracts known as Desktop, the personal computer was almost
literally dropped on every Marine's doorstep.
2. The Desktop Series Contracts
On October 3, 1983 the first of what turned out to be a series of contracts was
signed between the United States Air Force Computer Acquisition Center (AFCAC) and
Zenith Data Systems (Bridges, 1989). The Air Force contract provided the vehicle for
all of the military services to purchase the Zenith Z-100/120 series microcomputer in a
package, along with a selection of software. This contract was known as Desktop I. On
October 2, 1984, The Z-150 microcomputer was provided on another segment of the
contract (Bridges, 1989). This provided TEMPEST capability microcomputers. On
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February 28, 1986 Desktop II was signed, again by the Air Force Computer Acquisition
Center (Bridges, 1989). This contract provided for the Zenith Z-248 microcomputer,
along with associated peripheral devices and system software. The Z-248 was an IBM-
compatible microcomputer, equipped with an 80286 microprocessor. It used the popular
MS-DOS operating system, as did its predecessors in Desktop I (McCarthy, (B), 1988,
p.37). The initial estimate from the Air Force was that there would be 90,000 units sold
under Desktov II (McCarthy, 1908, p.37). Desktop II proved to be hugely successful, and
can be credited with bringing microcomputers to the squadron level. The unexpected
success of Desktop II caused problems during the contract. On November 24, 1987 a
moratorium was placed on new orders of Z-248 computcrs after it was dis.-overed that
total orders for the machine were already double the initial estimates (McCarthy, 1988,
p. 37 ). The contract was allowed to continue, however, until its planned expiration date
in February 1989. Although Zenith Data Systems refuses to release sales figuies for this
contract (Bridges, 1989), estimates put the number of Z-248 machines acquired under
Desktop H at 400,000 for the Department of Defense (Brewin and Danca, 1989, p.49).
When the number of microcomputers obtained under the earlier Desktop I is considered,
the total number of Zenith microcomputers owned by the Department of Defense
approached 500,000 units (McCarthy (B), 1988, p.37).
In August 1988 the Air Force issued a request for proposals (RFP) for a
follow-on, Desktop U contract (Reed, 1988, p.1). Having "opened the door" to personal
computing with Desktop U, Desktop III was designed to bring more sophisticated
computing power to the individual while maintaining continuity with already-existing
I1
machines (Reed, 1988, p.49). The RFP for Desktop I called for two different machines.
One would resemble the machine procured under Desktop I. A second, more advanced
machine, based on the 80386SX microprocessor, would also be available. Both of the
new machines would operate under the MS-DOS operating system as before, but would
also be compatible with the UNIX operating system. (Reed, 1988, p.4 9) The RFP also
required a wide variety of peripheral devices and software, including spreadsheets, word
processors and data base managers for both machines (Reed, 1988, p.49).
Initial estimates forecast orders under Desktop III to be 200,000 to 250,000
machines, although Air Force spokesmen were quick to point out that this was only a
rough estimate (Reed, 1988, p.1). Desktop II was initially planned to be implemented
during the first calendar quarter of 1989, with the first deliveries to be made in April or
May of 1989 (Reed,1988,p.49).
In March 1989 International Technology Corporation, a small federal computer
vendor, protested the Desktop II RFP, contending that its terms limited competition to
manufacturers, large systems integrators, and particularly, the incumbent Zenith Data
Systems (Brewin and Midford, 1989, p.1). As a result of the challenge, Desktop Il was
not brought into effect as early as originally hoped. To counteract the absence of an
umbrella Desktop contract, both the Navy and the Army let smaller, interim contracts to
allow for continued procurement of Zenith 248 or Zenith 248-compatible machines until
Desktop I was signed (Palmer and Brewin, 1989, p.37).
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In November 1989 Desktop III was awarded to Unisys Corporation (Brewin
and Danca,1989,p.l). Under the terms of the contract up to 250,000 machines would be
delivered, worth an estimated 700 million dollars. Unisys based its bid on the use of its
PW-2 line of microcomputers which 80286, 80386, and 80386SX microprocessors
(Brewin and Danca, 1989, p.1). Zenith Data Systems immediately protested the selection
of the Unisys machine, but withdrew its protest in early January 1990 (Robb, 1990, p. 1).
At the same time that Desktop Ill was unveiled, the Navy revealed the results
of the Standard Desktop Companion contract. Under this five-year contract Zenith Data
Systems was to provide for software upgrades and hardware peripherals for the existing
microcomputers obtained under the Desktop II contract (Smithmidford, 1989, p. 1).
As a result of the Desktop series contracts and associated maintenance and
upgrade contracts, the Marine Corps was catapulted into the information age at the small
unit level. Although the Marine Corps received a small percentage of the total Zenith
microcomputers acquired under Desktop, a platform 'd been established with which
many Marines would become very familiar. Figure 2 summarizes the machines purchased
under the Desktop contracts.
3. ADPE-FMF: The "Greea Machine"
The Automated Data Processing Equipment for the Fleet Marine Force (ADPE-
FMF), also known as the "Green Machine", was the first personal computer to find its
way into the Fleet Marine Force at the squadron/battalion level and below. Although it




4 0 0 ............................
3 0 0 ....... ... . . .. . .................................................  .......... ...............................
200 ...... ... ............. .........................................
100 ~
0
7 100 110 . Z 50 Z-248 :2; Unisys 3- p:of;
Figure 2. Desktop Contracts
classified as EUC. its introduction into the Fleet Marine Force was nevertheless a major
milestone in the advancement of computer awareness in the mainstream Marine Corps.
a. Background
The Green Machine came as a result of a number of studies contracted
by the Marine Corps beginning in 1974 (Aday and Pierce, 1982, p.19). The Marine Corps
noted that the data collection effort to feed the major Automratcd '-formation Systems
(AIS)'s maintained at the headquarters level was taxing the unit commanders. At the
same time, the commanders' own information needs were not being met (Aday and
Pierce, 1982, p.19). To avert a potential major problem, the Marine Corps looked at
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various ways to gather the necessary information more quickly and efficiently. As a
result the concept of Source Data Automation (SDA) was developed (Holste, 1984, p.30).
Before SDA, data collection and entry involved multiple intermediate steps between the
data source and its ultimate host computer. Efficiency, accuracy, and timeliness all
suffered in systems that were initially touted to improve all three. The beauty of SDA
was that it provided a direct connection between the data source and its host computer.
The benefits of such a concept are obvious. In 1976 the Stanford Research Institute (SRI)
performed what turned out to be a landmark study for the advancement of the SDA
concept in the Marine Cerps. In their study
SRI drew some conclusions regarding SDA in the FMF. Those conclusions were
that the FMF units down to the battalion and squadron level had a requirement for
an organic SDA capability. Additionally, the use of minicomputer and
microcomputer technology was feasible at the lower command echelons. (Aday and
Pierce, 1982, p.22)
In 1978 a Required Operational Capability (ROC) was developed and an
economic analysis performed. It was decided that SDA devices should be provided to all
elements of a Marine Air/Ground Task Force. The devices should be inexpensive, easily
deployable, must utilize commercial off-the-shelf equipment, and should be able to be
operated by non-technical personnel. They were required to support five major functional
areas: pay and manpower, supply, maintenance, aviation, and training. A contract was
awarded to IBM for SDA equipment on March 1, 1980 which became the ADPE-FMF
contract (Aday and Pierce, 1982, p.2 4 ). Initial implementation of the Green Machine was
completed on the West Coast during 1981. with implementation for the rest of the FMF
occurring within 18 months (Aday and Pierce, 1982, p.14, Fresquez, 1981. p.17).
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b. Description
The Green Machine was an IBM 4110 mini-computer with commercially-
available, off-the-shelf data processing equipment which had been "ruggedized" and
packaged to meet Marine Corps requirements. The Central Processing Unit had a
memory size of 64 kilobytes, expandable to 128 Kbytes. Two disk drives were provided
which accommodated the eight inch diskettes. No hard drive was installed. A video
display and keyboard was integral to the Green Machine. A terminal printer, provided
with all machines. enabled the unit to retain a local copy of the data which had been
submitted, and to print local reports. (Aday and Pierce, 1982, p.30) Finally, each Green
Machine contained an integral modem capable of providing asynchronous communications
over the spectrum of 75 to 1200 bits per second (Aday and Pierce, 1982, D.3 1).
In addition to the standard equipment described above, special equipment
was provided to units which were deploying or had special requirements. A magnetic
tape drive unit capable of reading and writing magnetic tapes was provided to some units.
A paper tape punch was provided to all units embarked aboard Navy ships which was
capable of punching five-level paper tape at a minimum of 75 bits per second. The paper
tape would then be delivered to the ship's communication center, where it would be sent
back to the United States for processing. (Aday and Pierce, 1982, p. 3 2 )
Some of the Green Machine's software features seem primitive eight
years later, but at the time they were state of the art. For example. it had only 40 Kbytes
available for applications after the operating system was installed. This seems incredibly
small, but it was, nevertheless, sufficient at the time. Other features of the Green
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Machine included the ability to be programmed in low and intermediate level COBOL.
This illustrates its potential as a device capable of running local applications. The Green
Machine provided a great deal of help to the user. In addition to numerous "help"
features, it also provided fully prompted interactive editing of input data and possessed
self-test diagnostic programs to isolate hardware faults (Aday and Pierce, 1982, p.42).
Thus it was truly a machine designed to be as simple as possible, and still allow for
efficient data capture.
c. Applications
The Green Machine was designed primarily as a SDA device for input
to Marine Corps Class I Automated Information Systems (AISs). This classification
system is composed of four classes of AISs which are categorized by the degree of
flexibility in operations permitted FMF commanders. A Class I system is one which is
processed on a mainframe computer, serves Marine Corps-wide users, and is under the
technical control of a contractor of a Marine Corps Central Data Processing Activity
(Aday and Pierce, 1982, p. 37 ). It is the largest and most comprehensive system AIS.
The Green Machine was designed to support 14 Class I applications. Those applications
are listed in Table 1 (Aday and Pierce, 1982, p.2 4 ).
The following estimate was made as to the time requirements for Class
I data submission.
It is estimated that approximately six to seven hours per day will be required just
to complete Class I inputs.. .Priorities will have to be established and monitored by
each unit. To get maximum return from these devices, it is evident that they will
have to be used beyond the standard eight-hour day. (Fresquez, 1981, p. 17)
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TABLE 1. FMF-ADPE CLASS I APPLICATIONS
AVIATION Flight Readiness Evaluation Data (FREDS)
Maintenance and Materiel Management (3-
M)
MANPOWER Unit Diary/Commander's Unit Diary Data
Base (UD/CUDDB)
FISCAL Allotment and Bond (ABA)
Transcript of Data Extraction (TODES)
Payment Option Election System (POES)
Disbursing Oficer's Voucher (DOV)
Military Pay List (MPL)
Military Pay Voucher (MPV)
Marine Air/Ground Financial Accounting
and Reporting System (MAGFARS)
LOGISTICS Supported Activities Supply System
(SASSY)
Marine Corps Integrated Maintenance
Management System (MIMMS)
OPERATIONS Marine Corps Combat Readiness
Evaluation System Software Application
(MCCRESSA)
COMMUNICATIONS Message Editing and Processing System
(MEPS)
In addition to the Class I requirements for the Green Machine, local
commanders were given the option to develop "Class IV" applications for local use. A
Class IV application is under the functional control of an FMF unit, with technical
responsibility assigned to an Information Systems Management Officer (ISMO). A Class
IV application is processed exclusively on local minicomputers for local use (Aday and
Pierce, 1982, p.38).
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The system of using Class IV applications was designed to give the local
units the opportunity to tailor their machine to meet individual requirements. Unit
members could scan application libraries maintained by local ISMO's, or could use in-
house resources to provide their own applications (Holste, 1984, p.31). Aday and Pierce
provided a recommended set of checklists to use to ensure an orderly development
process when developing local applications. These guidelines specified the development
model to be utilized in analyzing requirements, designing the application, and writing the
code. They also specified the documentation requirements, up to and including a User's
Manual and a Data Dictionary description of the elements in the application (Aday and
Pierce. 1982, pp. 112-124). Once the application was developed, debugged, and approved
(by the local commanding officer) copies of the application would be provided to the
local ISMO for inclusion into his application library.
d. Results
The Green Machine was a total success in its role as a SDA device. The
most popular measure of effectiveness for the Green Machine was the Unit Diary, which
contains crucial manpower and pay-related information for the local unit. Acceptance
rates (the measure used for the percentage of syntactically correct and properly formatted
data) for West Coast units using the Green Machine showed immediate improvements of
from 2.6 percent to 5.4 percent while showing error rate decreases ranging from 38.2 to
72.6 percent (Aday and Pierce, 1982, p.44). Similar benefits were recorded in other Class
I applications, particularly in the Marine Integrated Maintenance Management System
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(MIMMS), the Supported Activities Supply System (SASSY), and the Flight Readiness
Evaluation Data Systems (FREDS) (Holste, 1984, p.30).
There were, however, "bugs" in the implementation and management of
the Green Machine. Many units felt that they had been left to their own devices with
respect to training on the Green Machine. Although IBM was contractually obligated to
provide initial training, the training that they provided was to higher level personnel in
Class I application areas. Actual usertraining was delegated to FMF commanders (Aday
and Pierce, 1982, p.56). In addition to the confusion felt regarding the machine, users
interviewed by Aday and Pierce felt that there was too much tasking from above
involving use of the Green Machine. In an already-tight schedule, many higher echelons
created additional ADP requirements, thus eliminating any chance of the squadron
commander using the machine for local applications. (Aday and Pierce, 1982, p.53)
Thus began the relationship between the computer and the FMF unit. The
Green Machine became an integral part of every Marine Corps squadron, and greatly
aided in the transition toward a more computer-aware Marine Corps. In August 1988
replacement of the 842 Green Machines with new machines began. The new machines
were developed under the Fleet Marine Force-End User Computing Equipment (EUCE-




Between the adopton of the Green Machine and the acquisition of Zenith
microcomputers obtained under (primarily) Desktop II, the Marine Corps learned much
about bringing data processing to the squadron/battalion level. A de facto standard had
been reached with the Zenith-series microcomputers. These computers illustrated the
advances that had been made since the advent of ADPE-FMF, such as increased processor
speed. increased primary and secuAdary memory, and ease of use. FMF commanders felt
that the Zenith computers were good, but that future computers must be "ruggedized" for
use in a deployed environment. Further, they insisted that the successor to the Green
Machine must be compatible with the Zenith-series computers. (IRM-5230-01,1989,p.I)
With these factors in mind, a successor was sought for the Green Machine. Selection was
made and fielding began in August 1988 (MCBul 5271,1989,p.5-8).
b. Description and Concept of Operations
The FMF-EUCE (designated ANAYYK-83 by the Marine Corps) machine
is an enhanced version of the 1IT XTRA/286 microcomputer. It was re-engineered to
provide the capacity to withstand environmental extremes required by FMF commanders.
It uses an 80286 microprocessor, with an 80287 Arithmetic Coprocessor installed. The
system is provided with two megabytes of main memory, with two-40 megabyte
removable hard drives installed. Provided also are an EGA color monitor, dot matrix
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printer with OCR font, and a detachable keyboard. Environmental protection is provided
via a hard transport case, and a surge protector. (MCBul 5 27 1,19 89,p.5 -9)
Conversion from the ADPE-FMF to the new FMF-EUCE was planned
to be evolutionary, with training on the new machine integrated into formal schools for
new personnel and limited contractual training/on-the-job training for Marines already in
the field (MCBul 5 2 7 1,19 89,p.5 -9 ). Virtually all other aspects of employment have
remained unchanged from the original Green Machine.
C. MARINE CORPS ORGANIZATION FOR END-USER COMPUTING
With the advent of the Green Machine, it was recognized that FMF units needed
special assistance with their now-organic ADP assets. Accordingly, a framework was
developed to augment the existing ADP support structure. This structure has not changed
since the beginning of the EUC revolution in the Marine Corps. For purposes of
discussion, the two parts of the framework closest to the actual end-user will be discussed
below. They are the Information Systems Management Officer (ISMO) and the
Information Systems Coordinator (ISC).
1. The Information Systems Management Officer
The Information Systems Management Officer (ISMO) is the primary staff
officer for information resource matters within a major (i.e., Wing) FMF command. The
Mid-Range Information Systems Plan defines his duties:
The ISMO is the primary staff officer for information resource matters within an
FMF or Supporting Fstablishment command. The ISMO's functions include: (1)
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Advising the commander and the staff on information technology matters. (2)
Acting as command focal point on all matters pertaining to coordination of
information technology requirements, objectives, concepts, plans, and policies,
including establishing priorities with supporting and external data processing
activities. (3) Exercising staff supervision of organic data processing units and
equipment. (4) Preparing IRM support estimates, operating and contingency plans,
and ensuring that these plans are tested. (MCBul 5271, 1989, p.3-7)
In short, the ISMO is expected to provide guidance and education to the FMF (and the
Supporting Establishment) in using not only organic Green Machine assets, but also in
the use of any other ADP equipment in the organization.
Further, the ISMO:
...seeks technical assistance from the units supporting RASC or MCCDPA. He/she
translates user requests into terms more familiar to the data processing personnel
in these activities. (Lehlanc, 1989, p.61)
There are 22 of these ISMO organizations throughout the Marine Corps, located at the
various Headquarters (Leblanc, 1989, p.60). The size of the ISMO units varies anywhere
from one officer and two enlis,,d Marines to 13 officers and 89 enlisted Marines. The
size is dependant upon the warfare specialty of the particular unit. Force Service Support
Groups rate the highest number of personnel because of their large number of ADP
activities. The Infantry Division, on the other hand, is entitled to one officer and two
enlisted Marines. The Marine Aircraft Wing is entitled to two officers and five enlisted
Marines. (MCBu 5271, 1989, p.4-5) Beside the number of personnel in the ISMO, their
geographic span of control is also important. Some ISMOs, such as that of the Second
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Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, have virtually all of their supported units within the
gates of the base. Other ISMO centers cover far more vast areas. The Second Marine
Aircraft Wing ISMO, for example, is responsible not only for assets at Marine Corps Air
Station (MCAS) Cherry Point in Havelock, North Carolina, but also for MCAS New
River in Jacksonville, North Carolina, and MCAS Beaufort in South Carolina.
The ISMO performs two major duties. The first duty is as a staff officer to
advise his Commanding General of ADP matters. His second area of responsibility is as
an educator to the units which the ISMO nominally supports. Leblanc sees this role as
closely resembling that of a formal Information Center (Leblanc, 1988, p.60).
2. The Information Systems Coordinator
The Information Systems Coordinator (ISC) is the individual closzst to the user
in a Marine Corps unit. This billet is designed to serve as the unit's point of contact
(with the ISMO) for ADP activities, to provide unit training and to provide assistance
whenever possible (Leblanc, 1988, p.61). At least at the squadron level, the ISC is a
collateral duty involving little or no training (Thombs, 1990). At the group level there
is still little or no formal training involved, but the responsibilities become greater. Group
ISCs administer machines throughout the group, advise the group commanding officer of




This chapter presented a brief overview of end-user computing in the Marine Corps.
The first computers in the small unit level of the Marine Corps were the Green Machines,
IBM 4110 minicomputers that were introduced to automate source data capture. They
also provided and continue to provide the unit commander with a limited ability to
generate reports and rosters from a large database.
In June 1983 the General Services Administration published a landmark document
"Managing End User Computing in the Federal Government". This work urged federal
managers to adopt a proactive strategy for EUC growth in ail areas of the federal
government. In addition to providing theoretical impetus, it provided practical guidance
on EUC growth and illustrated the GSA's intention of streamlining microcomputer
acquisition for lower-level management. This document led to the Marine Corps' first
guidelines on EUC published in October of 1984.
A series of contracts with Zenith Data Systems has provided the Department of
Defense with over 500,000 Zenith microcomputers. The Desktop contracts were
originally engineered by the Air Force, but in a way that enabled the other services to
purchase these microcomputers as well. Desktop lI expired in February 1989 and a
follow-on was scheduled to begin immediately afterward. There was a great deal of
difficulty arriving at a winner for Desktop Hm. Although Unisys was awarded the contract
in November 1989, protests have been filed by other competitors which were eventally
dropped.
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A framework was developed for providing EUC support at the small unit level
during the implementation of the Green Machine. The Information Systems Management
Officer (ISMO) is a general staff officer whose responsibility it is to supervise ADP
employment, training, and acquisition within his particular unit. His office is staffed with
anywhere from three to 92 Marines, depending on the nature of his unit. His point of
contact at the small unit level is the Information Systems Coordinator (ISC), an officer
or enlisted Marine who fills the billet as a collateral duty.
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m. END-USER COMPUTING STRATEGY MODELS
A. INTRODUCTION
Because of its enormous impact on virtually all aspects of society, there has been
a great deal of examination of the EUC phenomenon over the past few years. This chapter
examines some of the research which has been performed in an attempt to understand
EUC. Some of the important attributes of a meaningful EUC model are illustrated,
followed by a motivation for the necessity of an overall strategy for EUC growth
managenient. Four of ihe models which have been used to analyze the EUC revolution
are discussed.
B. NECESSARY MODEL ATTRIBUTES
In an area where rapid change is occurring, two pieces of information are vital.
First, the manager must know where his organization is located in respect to a well-
defined continuum. The second piece of information is a logical outgrowth of the first:
the manager must have a target at which to aim his organization. It is vital that these
actions be performed overtly in an area as complicated and nebulous as EUC.
To effectively help the planner, EUC models must be descriptive so that the
individual may accurately identify the location of his organization. An EUC model must
also present a continuum of states in which an organization can be located. Finally, the
model must be prescriptive. There will undoubtedly be many paths to take for any
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particular organization. The ideal model should identify the advantages and disadvantages
of a particular course of action for each particular (or at least general category of)
organization. This will help the individual choose a rational "target" and migration path
for his organization.
C. IMPORTANCE OF A PREDEFINED STRATEGY
The importance of an overall strategy to an organization has been substantially
documented. A strategic outlook enables the manager to determine a direction for his
organization to move. It will be shown that the need for a predefined strategy has been
late in coming to the EUC environment. Management did not "invent" EUC. Rather,
end-user computing, by definition, grew from the ground up. However, over a period of
time it has evolved from a homegrown phenomenon to a resource large enough to both
dramatically help or hinder an organization. As early as 1983 Rockart and Flannery
discussed the need for an end-user strategy in organizations.
Little attention has been paid to the development of a strategy for end-user
computing either in the organizations we studied or in the perhaps two dozen
organizations with which we have discussed these findings since the study.. If one
believes: (1) that end-user computing will reach 50-70 percent of the MIPS in
almost every corporation in the next several years; (2) that end-user oriented
"information databases" have increasingly become an integral part of the working
environment of major corporate staffs; and (3) that rapid change in the tools and
techniques available in this area require guidance--then, the lack of a strategy and
a clear long-range plan in this area is a serious mistake for the I/S function.
(Rockart and Flannery, 1983, p.778)
The importance of a model which provides for an EUC strategy becomes more
clear. Four models will now be examined which show different ways of defining the
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EUC environment. Each has a different specific strategic direction. In all but one, the
models are comprehensive to all aspects of a strategy. The final model, developed by
Euske and Dolk, addresses control of EUC, a subset of a strategy. It is presented because
of its similarity and applicability to an entire strategy.
D. ALAVI, NELSON, AND WEISS'S END-USER COMPUTING STRATEGY
FRAMEWORK
Alavi, Nelson, and Weiss believe that organizational computing is currently in a
state of flux because of end-user computing (Alavi, Nelson and Weiss, 1987-88, p. 2 8.
They urge all organizations to evaluate themselves regarding end-user computing:
If a shift is occurring which imposes significantly greater expectations on end-users,
then the organization must develop a strategy to ensure that these expectations are
realized.. Development of an effective end-user computing strategy may be the most
important short-term decision the organization can make if it hopes to benefit from
its investments in end-user-based technologies. (Alavi, Nelson, and Weiss, 1987-88,
p.29)
Alavi et al. work toward two goals: the development of a set of EUC strategies and
the design of a framework, or timetable, for their implementation within an organization.
They identify five categories commonly identified in the literature: Laissez-faire.
Monopolist, Acceleration, Marketing, and Operations-based. These strategies are
evaluated along three dimensions of EUC management: policy setting and planning,
support, and control. (Alavi, Nelson, and Weiss, 1987-88, p.30) Policy setting identifies
appropriate and acceptable EUC practices. Planning, on the other hand, refers to the
identification of goals and objectives, and the establishment of a framework for utilizing
resources. EUC support refers to tools and training which enhance EUC capabilities
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within the organization. Control refers to the processes which are set in place to ensure
that policies are complied with and that goals are met. (Alavi, Nelson, and Weiss, 1987-
88. p. 3 3 )
1 Laissez-faire Strategy
A Laissez-faire strategy is, essentially, no strategy other than a tacit
acknowledgement cf EUC in the organization. No organizational policies are provided
regarding standards, acquisition tools, or data management. EUC activities are unplanned.
Support for end-users is provided solely by local "experts", self-trained individuals who
have become proficient in an area of expertise. There are no controls placed on the
individuals, but access to corporate database is denied to end-users.
The Laissez-faire strategy can be viewed in two ways. First, it can be viewed
as an 'entry level" trategy. In this sense it is assumed that there is some interest from
management in the outcome of EUC in the organization. However, the onus is placed
entirely on the users. This is called "wait and see" by the authors, but is actually closer
to "sink or swim". The other view of Laissez-faire is that it is not so much a strategy as
it is a condition in an organization. In this situation there is no active thought regarding
EUC by management.
2. Monopolist Strategy
The Monopolist strategy is diametrically opposed to the Laissez-faire strategy.
"The policy setting and planning, support, and control dimensions in a Monopolist
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strategy are geared to restricting EUC activities." (Alavi, Nelson, and Weiss, 1987-88,
p. 37 ) This strategy is concerned primarily with efficient and cost-justified applications
of computer technology.
Policy setting in this environment is tightly structured. Virtually all aspects
of the EUC environment are regulated, often by the Management Information System
(MIS)/Data Processing (DP) Department. Very strict standards are enacted and enforced.
Little planning is required, since the highly-structured environment precludes the need for
planning. Training that is provided is usually ad hoc and infrequent. As in the Laissez-
faire strategy, access to the corporate databases is denied to end-users. As can be
imagined, control under the Monopolist strategy is very high. Many control mechanisms
are put in place, such as chargeback systems, development and operational controls,
and/or audit and review teams. (Alavi, Nelson, and Weiss, 1987-88, p.38)
3. Acceleration Strategy
The Acceleration strategy is almost exactly the opposite of the Monopolist
strategy. Whereas the growth of EUC is intentionally stifled under the Monopolist
strategy, in the Acceleration strategy enthusiasm toward EUC is actively sought. "The
acceleration strategy is based on a philosophy of 'the user knows best."' (Alavi, Nelson,
and Weiss, 1987-88, p.3 8)
Typically the Acceleration strategy is administered through the use of an
Information Center (IC). Here users are given support and education by a trained staff,
based upon the expressed needs of the users. Policy closely resembles that of the
Laissez-faire strategy: there is little formal or restrictive policy. Planning is largely
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reactive, based upon the actual situation, not the desired situation. Support in an
Acceleration strategy is very strong. End-users get frequent and timely support through
the IC. Since the support is generated by their own requests and not corporate policy, the
direction of EUC in an organization is largely uncharted. Although IC's have the
potential for molding EUC to meet corporate guidelines, this is not the case in an
Acceleration strategy. Control is limited in an Acceleration strategy. There may be
mechanisms that resemble those employed in a Monopolist strategy; for example, a policy
of reviewing EUC acquisition requests, but the Acceleration strategy looks at this review
as a means of enhancing quality whereas the Monopolist strategy views it as a way to
restrict acquisition.
4. Marketing Strategy
Of the strategies discussed so far, the Marketing strategy is the most proactive
toward the development of EUC in the organization. Under the Marketing strategy, the
organization has a firm idea of where it desires EUC to progress. It seeks to increase
EUC use, but the increase will be in consonance with organizational goals.
The policies and plans under the Marketing strategy are more formal.
Standards exist and are enforced, but the emphasis is on leading end-users to the
standards by means of advertising, support. and value-added products.
Support for end-users is necessarily extensive. The support organization
consists of two levels. The centralized MIS/DP department provides overall guidance by
providing technical support and ensuring that the direction sought by end-users coincides
with corporate goals. The decentralized support groups provide the interface to the end-
32
users themselves. These groups answer day-to-day questions and support locally-
generated applications development. Questions that they are unable to answer are referred
to the MIS/DP department for further clarification. The emphasis placed upon Control
under the Marketing strategy is to direct end-users toward the goals of the organization.
This is done partially by the use of the standards described above. Rather than "hitting
walls" as in the Monopolist strategy, end-users are "deflected" and guided forward.
5. The Operations-based Strategy
The fifth strategy discussed is called Operations-based. This is the most
integrative, mature strategy involving EUC in the organization. In this environment the
information generated by EUC has risen to the level of importance achieved by traditional
Automated Information Systems. All aspects of EUC are scrutinized and controlled to
benefit the organization directly. Standalone units are linked into local area networks.
There is a high degree of interconnectivity between all departments in the organization.
The planning involved in the Operations-based strategy is extensive. There is
no more "EUC for EUC's sake". There is a high degree of computer literacy throughout
the organization. Policies are designed to efficiently utilize all EUC assets, and hence are
tightly structured.
Support under an Operations-based strategy is available, but is generally more
sophisticated due to the sophistication of the end-users. The emphasis again is on
efficiency, and also of utilizing and integrating EUC with sophisticated corporate ADP
assets such as corporate databases.
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Control under an Operations-based strategy is extremely high. Since end-users
are permitted access to virtually all of the information vital to the organization, there must
be checks to ensure that compliance with established guidelines is maintained. Also, the
emphasis on efficiency must be reinforced by control measures. Chargeback systems,
where access or equipment time is charged against a department's budget, is an example
of the type of control utilized under an Operations-based strategy.
6. Guidelines for Adoption of EUC Strategies
The underlying assumption made by Alavi et al. is that the strategies described
are almost all appiopriate at some time in an organization's level of EUC development.
The trick, then, is to determine which strategy is appropriate when, and which strategies
are not appropriate at all to the organization. They used a premise developed by
McFarlan and McKenney (1983) as a framework for development of a "timetable".
McFarlan and McKenney believed that there is a "learning curve" in every organization
regarding EUC. They classified stages of this learning curve into five main areas to
which Alavi, Nelson, and Weiss add an additional phase (Alavi, Nelson, and Weiss, 1987-
88, p.41).
a. Pre-Strategy phase
In this phase there is only an unconscious attitude relating to EUC in an
organization. There is a growing perception that people are using their own computing
assets, but the organizational ramifications have not been explicitly developed. This
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phase will lead to one of two possible outcomes. Either the organization will realize the
benefits of EUC to the organization and proceed with an integration plan, or EUC will
be left to its own devices.
b. Phase 0
Phase 0 is the phase that Alavi, Nelson, and Weiss have introduced to the
model. This phase is similar to the Pre-strategy phase in that it represents initial attitudes
on the part of the organization. Unlike the Pre-strategy phase, however, Phase 0 shows
an explicit realization that EUC is a force with which to be reckoned. This will lead to
one of two paths. If the organization is excited about the possibilities presented by EUC,
a Laissez-faire strategy will be taken. This is indicative of a plan with a great deal of
enthusiasm but little planning. The alternative course of action is the adoption of a
Monopolist strategy. This strategy will be adopted early to hold EUC in place until the
organization can more fully evaluate its impact, and prepare for its arrival.
Phase 0 seems to be the most transitory of the phases. Each of the
strategies that occur in Phase 0 present inefficiencies and dissatisfaction that are addressed
in Phase I.
c. Phase I
Regardless of the initial strategy taken, either Laissez-faire or Monopolist,
Phase I is characterized by the realization that EUC can play an important role in the
function of the organization, and that it should be developed more fully. Phase I sees the
adoption of an Acceleration strategy. Control is still kept to a minimum; plans and
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policies are general and product-oriented. Support during this phase becomes more
formalized; the local expert relied upon in Phase 0 is augmented or qupplanted by more
formal support structures, such as the Information Center.
The chief indicator of the maturity of this phase is the demand for
technology and support noted in the organization. At some point the organization must
make an assessment of its EUC maturity, and think of its end-users as a customer base
in and of itself. At this time a strategy of directed growth is needed.
d. Phase II
The need for directed growth noted at the conclusion of Phase I leads to
a Marketing strategy in Phase !1. In this phase the organization has a better idea of
which direction it wants EUC to take, so planning becomes more complete. Those plans
are implemented by the addition of a central planning and policy structure to guide the
support facilities. This enables the organization to shape the direction of growth in a
positive, proactive manner. If these methods do not provide the necessary direction,
controls may have to be added to supplement the support structures. A reversion to
uncontrolled growth could damage the organization at this time since EUC has, by now,
penetrated the organization to a high degree.
e. Phase III
The authors introduce a new strategy in Phase III which they call
Containment. They call it a strategy for lack of a better word; actually this phase is a
"breathing spell" in the progression of EUC growth. The purpose of this phase is to let
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the organization digest and assimilate the rapid change made throughout the past three
phases. Progress is not stifled, as in the Monopolist strategy, but rather the -ipiais is
placed on lateral growth. There is potential for reversion to a Monopolist strategy,
however, if this phase is kept in place for a period of time. Controls are necessarily
tightened; if corresponding progress is not made, user dissatisfaction could start to appear.
Prior to this, the last phase should be entered.
f. Phase IV
Phase IV represents the mature organization with regard to EUC. This
phase is characterized by the adoption of the Operations-based strategy. In this phase
EUC is not an end, but rather another effective tool to effectively pursue the
organization's strategic aims.
The Operations-based strategy adopted in Phase IV seeks to tie up all the
loobe ends and connect the individual departments into an integrated information-sharing
facility. Local area networks (LANs) and software libraries appear to provide a
commonality with which to implement inter-department activities.
7. Conclusions
Both Alavi et al. and McFarlan and McKenney arrive at conclusions regarding
EUC growth. They believe that there is a defimite progression through a series of
reasonably well-defined stages. They feel that the stages are all important to the
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successful development of EUC in the organization. These stages may be abbreviated or
lengthened, but they should not be skipped. Further, the authors feel that these stages can
be pla,,iicd for and anticipated.
E. HUFF, MUNRO, MARTIN, AND MOORE
Two articles have been written which both advance and challenge the theories
presented by Alavi, Nelson, and Weiss. Huff, Munro, and Martin (1988) present an
entirely new concept in gauging EUC maturity within an organization. Huff, Munro, and
Moore (1987-8) complement this article, by providing a proactive framework for
navigation through the various strategies suggested earlier.
1. The Applications Maturity Metric
Martin et al. point out that EUC maturity in microcosm is continuously
changing within an organization of any size. At any given time there is a huge diversity
in experience, expertise and capabilities among end-users. Rather than take an "average"
of the end-user capabilities within an organization, results which are more meaningful
than simply deriving an aggregate expertise level are sought. The means that they use
to evaluate EUC maturity in organizations is the applications that have been developed
for use by the end-users. Although some applications are bound to be too sophisticated
for the average user at any given time, the steady progression in application development
is, they feel, indicative of the overall corporate EUC maturity level. Martin et al. have
identified five main stages of application maturity within an organization.
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a. Isolation Stage
In this preliminary stage, EUC is in an expennLental phase within the
organization. The level of applications dependence by the individual in the course of his
daily work is minimal. The end-user is "getting the feel" of things for later development.
b. Standalone Stage
In this stage the end-user has become proficient in the use of his ADP
equipment in some aspects of his daily routine. He has often developed his own simple
applications. His work is not compatible with tha: )f the organization, but it is
meaningful for hiin. All data entry is entered manually by the end-user.
c. Manual Integration Stage
By the time the Manual Integration Stage is reached, the applications that
have been developed are much more useful to the organization. Initial failures have
provided experience in designing applications appropriate throughout the organization.
Data can be shared, but it must be, passed manually either by physical diskette transfer
between machines, or by manual file passing in LANs.
d. Automated Integration Stage
This stage marks the advent of truly integrated systems. Applications are
d .loped that employ automatic connections among machines of all types throughout the
organizations. The need for standards becomes crucial during this period, and they
become more stringent. In this stage end-users must still know the physical location of
the information to be retrieved.
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e. Distributed Integration Stage
By the time this stage is reached, the location of the data to the individual
is truly transparent. Desktop, departmental, and corporate level databases are all within
reach, depending on security restrictions imposed by the organization. These stages are
relatively independent of any particular technology, but are indicative of EUC growth
over time in any organization. This continuum is drastically different from the one
presented by Alavi, Nelson, and Weiss. Martin et al. describe the growth of EUC, but
they offer little in the way of proactively affecting EUC in the organization. Huff, Munro
and Moore add another aspect to the model which helps to give it a prescriptive quality.
2. Expansion and Control: The Other Dimension
Alavi et al. portray the continuum toward EUC maturity in a fairly 1lieir, one-
dimensional fashion. The rate at which the progression is made can speed up or slow
down, but, with the exception of the Containment phase, it doesn't progress laterally.
Huff, Munro, and Moore add the growth stages described by Alavi, Nelson, and Weiss
to the Applications Maturity model to add a second dimension to the EUC growth model.
Four strategies are described: Laissez-faire, Acceleration, Controlled Growth (a
compilation of Marketing and Operations-based), and Containment (Monopolist). These
strategies are used laterally within all Applications maturity stages. Moore et al. suggest
that each of these four strategies represents a relative mixture of control and expansion,
the two key ingredients to growth of EUC. Further, every organization will progress in
a circular direction through these strategies until they find one that "fits" the needs of that
particular Applications maturity stage. At that time the EUC growth will continue on to
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the next stage of applications maturity. This presents a model that is far more compex
than Alavi. Nelson. and Wei - , but -lsc provides management with far more flexibility
in planning. For example, a Containment policy may be inappropriate in certain stages
of EUC development, but perfectly appropriate in others.
3. Conclusions
Moore et al. agree with Alavi, Nelson, and Weiss that organizations pass
through pre-determined stages on the way to maturity. They indicate that it is
management's responsibility to determine the proper mix of expansion and control to
optimize each phase. This sounds logical, but is not realistic. Relative mixes of
expansion and control are hard to quantify into a plan of action,. The best that this model
can do for a manager is to give him an idea of what stage he's in, once the organization
is already there. What is needed is an ,ptimal strategy for EUC growth.
F. GERRITY AND ROCKART
Thomas P. Gerrity and John Rockart are high in their praise for thL potential of
EUC to benefit all aspects of the organization. They do not subscribe to the timetable
philosophy developed by the models described above. They look at three strategies that
have been discussed earlier not as evolutionary but rather as strategies to avoid at any
time in the organization's lifecycle.
They feel that the Monopolist strategy has outlived its usefulness for a number of
reasons, including the increased availability (and decreased price) of ADP assets, the lack
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of staff members to man large centrally-controlled operations, and the increased ADP
iiteracy of managers and staff professionals outside the ADP departments.
The Laissez-faire strategy has led to the type of uncontrolled acceleration predicted
by Alavi, Nelson, and Weiss. Gerrity and Rockart note:
As a result of this approach, almost half of the corporate computer resources at one
of the world's largest electronics companies are now being consumed by
management and staff who are developing and running Thir Era systems. The
corporation's posture of letting people "do their own thing" has led to a current
forecasted requirement of acquiring an additional large maiframe computer every
sL- months just to support end users. (Gerrity and Rockart, 1986, p.29)
Additional factors arguing against the Laissez-faire strategy are: EUC not aligned with
corporate goals, a lack of ongoing support, and the inefficient use of ADP equipment due
to lack of standards.
Gerrity and Rockart describe their third strategy as the Information Center approach.
This is similar to the Marketing strategy noted earlier in that it attempts to provide a
focused managerial approach to end-user computing. (Gerrity and Rockart, 1986, p. 2 9 )
The IC approach falls short, however, because it does not provide a complete solution to
the EUC environment in an organization. ICs focus on support and control, only two
elements of a successful strategy. The Information Center is an architectural solution to
a problem that has not been defined. Defining the problem and dealing with it in an
organized fashion are the most important things an organization can do in dealing with
EUC. Defining the problem and dealing with it are alternate ways of saying that one
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must identify the problem and choose a strategic direction to deal with ;t. To accomplish
this, Gerrity and Rockart suggest a new strategy which they call a Managed Free
Economy.
The Managed Free Economy seeks to give users the freedom to define, create, and
develop their own applications while they adhere to regulations enacted to ensure that
their effort is aligned with that of the organization. Whilc Gerrity and Rockart do not do
much more to describe this strategy, they continue by defining five key attributes of a
strategy that they feel will help steer toward a Managed Free Economy strategy and
successful EUC within an organization.
1. Attributes of a Successful EUC Strategy
a. Stated End-user Strategy
In an area with as many different participants as there are in EUC it is
vital that all be made aware of the desired direction of EUC in the organization. In a
centralized environment technicians may be able to implicitly understand the strategic
direction, but in EUC management must make explicit mention of the direction EUC is
to take.
b. User/IS Partnership
If meaningful contributions are expected from end-users, they must be
consulted and made participants in all aspects of the ADP environment. Since they will
be expected to develop applications which will help the organization, they should have
access to the acquisition process. The IS department within the organization should
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actively seek the input of end-users in hardware and software development. Rules and
standards should be developed between the two groups. The IS department is and will
be a viable entity, but only as long as they remain effective in meeting the needs of EUC.
c. Targeting Critical Systems and Applications
This attribute expands upon the previous attribute. The process of
allowing applications to "bubble up" from the bottom is time-consuming and reactive.
An overall strategy must include a commitment to seek out and develop either fledgling
applications that hold universal promise, or critical areas that must have applications
developed for them. As EUC consumes more and more ADP resources, it must be
utilized with care.
d. Integrated Support Organization
Support for end-users is vital to its success in an organization. There
have been many methods proposed to provide the necessary support. This support must
contain (at least) two key attributes The support must be dedicated and identifiable, and
it must be readily available. Having support "dedicated and identifiable" suggests a
central support agency organized with the support role clearly identified in its mission
statement. This would prevent the support staff from being drawn off to meet minor
problems to the exclusion of helping end-users. To have support readily available
sugge'ts a more de-centralized method, where staff members could b! assigned to an
operational department for assistance. The organization should have both of these
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support elements present, and should additionally count on a third level of support, the
local expert. The local expert is the ultimate end-user: a consummate ADP user whose
primary role is within the business area of the organization. This local expert can serve
as an interface between the technical approach of an ADP professional and the strictly
business approach of the end-user.
e. Education throughout the Organization
Support for end-users is critical. Yet, without the establishment of a
reasonable knowledge base for end-users to draw from, "support" becomes a euphemism
for the IC doing the job. Any technical area requires education, and the need for EUC
to be formally presented is especially important. The pace of technological growth in
EUC is incredible. It is vital that end-users be taught initially to a reasonable level, and
that appropriate follow-on education be conducted.
2. Conclusions
Gerrity and Rockart have taken a different approach than the previous authors.
The concept of a lifecycle is not presented. Rather, three different strategies are evaluated
and discarded in favor of a broad, rather vague, strategy to be embraced. This Managed
Free Market strategy is comprised of five critical attributes, which provide a proactive
guide to establishing an effective EUC strategy within the organization. The explicit
definition of an EUC strategy is vitally important to the ultimate success of EUC within
the organization.
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G. EUSKE AND DOLK
The final model that will be examined is actually only part of a complete strategy
model. The importance of control of EUC to its development within the organization has
been pointed out by all of the previous models. Euske and Dolk (1989) have examined
control mechanisms for EUC and arrived at conclusions which, while not representative
of an overall strategy, provide many factors that should be considered in developing a
strategy.
Euske and Dolk have examined the models described above, in addition to the
Nolan Stage Moc :i (Nolan, 1977), to arrive at conclusions concerning the nature of
existing controls in organizations and the potential for improved means to control EUC.
Nolan's Stage Model is one of the best-known models which asserts that EUC maturity
within an organization follows a predictable pattern. To evaluate the stage of EUC in an
organization, Nolan looked at four areas within the EUC context: data processing (DP)
planning and control, DP organization, applications portfolio, and user awareness. By
examining these four areas Nolan was able to place an organization within his Stage
model. Euske and Dolk adopt these areas to describe three models which they feel
represent control alternatives to Nolan and the associated EUC models described above.
One minor change that they make is the substitution of Information Center for DP
organization.
1. The Bureaucratic Model
Euske and Dolk assert that the Bureaucratic Model underlies Nolan's stage
model and its affiliated EUC counterparts. In the Bureaucratic environment explicit
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policies and standards are in effect. The overall planning and control is highly
centralized. There may be an Information Center, but it is very much like a computer
center. The overall focus in the Bureaucratic Model is the efficient monitoring of the
end-users. In this model the end-users are not sophisticated, and need to be helped. The
logic in this model is that if the end-users obey the rules, the desired outcome will result
for the organization.
2. The Norm-based Model
The Norm-based Model is descriptive of a naturally-occurring, transitional state
within an organization. It is not an explicit control strategy per se, but rather an
observable point along the way for EUC. In the Norm-based Model the explicit, central
controls found in the Bureaucratic model are one. End-users are much more computer
literate, and consequently are much more aware of the need to conform to certain rules
regarding EUC. The rules, however, are informal and in many cases tacit among the
users. If an Information Center exists, the authors indicate that it is much more like a
"service center". The end-users likely would come to this IC with a specific, often
technical question concerning an application. Since the end-users are more computer
literate, it is safe to assume that their applications would be more sophisticated. Euske
and Dolk feel that these applications would develop into decision support system (DSS)
applications, where they would become much more valuable.
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3. Virtual Market
The final model presented for EUC is that of the Virtual Market. In the
Virtual Market the EUC organization consists of "power users and local experts". The
effect of this high level of user sophistication is that EUC has been incorporated into the
overall business strategy. EUC no longer exists as an identifiable entity. The
applications have merged into the business itself. Planning, control, standards and
policies all concern the performance of EUC vis a vis the organization. This is the
highest level of EUC sophistication, and so requires the least amount of overt control.
Euske and Dolk see these models as stages that organizations may see many
times throughout the life of EUC in a particular organization. EUC by its nature creates
a de facto Norm-based situation. From there the organization can be overtly moved to
a Bureaucratic environment, or a gradual shift toward the Virtual Market may occur. The
introduction of new, less literate end-users might be enough to "drop" EUC in an
organization back to the Norm-based. It is conceiv'ble that if performance lags further
then overt controls characteristic of a Bureaucratic strategy might be required.
4. Conclusions
In describing EUC strategies strictly in terms of the control environment
observed and desired, the authors pass over the means derived to decide on the particular
control environment desired; that is, the strategy. Nevertheless, these three control
strategies do much to help understand the relationship of control to EUC within an
organization. Of particular importance is the idea that important contributions to the
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control of EUC can be made by the end-users themselves. These contribution, in turn,
should affect the nature of the strategy directed upon the organization. For example,
based upon the maturity of the users and the control environments in place at Marine
Corps squadrons, central planners could move to a centralized, standardized environment
or a decentralized, ISMO-controlled environment.
H. SUMMARY
This chapter has examined the importance of an overall strategy to the successful
development of EUC within an organization. The use of models to assist in evaluating
strategies was then presented. Models must be able to describe the environment in which
an organization is residing, and they must be able to prescribe the direction for future
movement.
Four models were presented which meet the qualifications listed above. In two of
the models EUC was presented as a predictable pattern of maturity levels over time. The
stages within these models all had important management aspects associated with them
that necessitate a pre-determined course of action to optimize them. The third model did
not present a lifecycle model but rather examined three historic EUC strategies, each of
which were determined to be ineffective. It presented a new "Free Market" strategy.
Most importantly, it proposed five key attributes that were essential to a successful EUC
strategy. The last model touched only on control of EUC. Three models of control were
developed which transcended traditional views of the importance of explicit control
measures. Two of the three models called for enforcement of implicit standards by the
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end-users themselves. While this paper did not address other aspects of an overall
strategy, it nonetheless provides insight into the importance of control to the overall
strategy for EUC within an organization.
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IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF MARINE CORPS END-USER STRATEGY
A. INTRODUCTION
Earlier chapters have examined general models used to describe EUC. This chapter
brings those models together in the context of the Marine Corps' EUC program. The
doctrinal EUC planning document for the Marine Corps, the Mid-Range Information
Systems Plan, is examined, and the Marine Corps is situated within the EUC models to
ascertain the current degree of success of EUC in the Marine Corps aviation arm.
B. DOCTRINAL MARINE CORPS EUC STRATEGY
1. The Mid-Range Information Systems Plan (MRISP)
The Mid-Range Information Systems Plan (MRISP) is presented in an annual
Marine Corps Bulletin developed by the Director, Command and Contrl,
Communications and Computer (C4) (MCBul 5271, 1989, p.1-3). The MRISP itself is
a seven-year revolving plan which describes the information resource needs, goals, and
strategies of the Marine Corps (MCBul 5271, 1989, p.1-3). It is a compendium of
information which the Director consolidates from the submissions of various major units
within the Marine Corps. The stated purpose of the MRISP is:
To distribute a plan that provides information on the current status and future
direction of the use of automatic data processing and data communications
technology within the Marine Corps. (MCBul 5271. 1989. Cover Page)
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The MRISP has enough information to allow the layman to gain a basic knowledge of
Marine Corps organization and the interrelationships which exist between ADP activities
and the organizations which they are designed to serve.
2. Overall Strategy
The overall strategy of the Marine Corps is to:
... centralize technical direction, policy formulation, and resource management at
HQMC under the Director, C4 Division, while providing data processing support
on a regional basis. This management framework fosters uniformity throughout the
Marine Corps through standardization of hardware and software to the maximum
extent possible while ensuring responsive support. (MCBul 5271, 1989, p.3-7 )
This strategy of centralized control and decentralized operations manifests itself within
the organization established for EUC in the Marine Corps. As stated above, the Director,
C4 Division oversees central control of the Marine Corps ADP environment. Regionally
distributed ISMOs, on the other hand, provide support for EUC.
3. Marine Corps Strategic End.User Computing Objectives
Each year the MRISP presents a set of strategic objectives. These objectives
...provide direction to the IRM (Information Resources Management) Program. The
developers of the MRISP state four basic assumptions which influenced the selection of
the current objectives.
First, functional managers and users will continue to increaze their request for the
development or enhancement of IS's and other IRM support. Second, IRM
personnel will require an increased level of knowledge and technical skills to deal
with the increasingly complex computer and data communications environments.
Third, functional managers and users will take on a larger role in the design,
development, and operation of IS's. Fourth, greater emphasis must be placed on
fielding IS's that can be supported while in a deployed or combat environment.
(MCBul 5271, 1989, p.4 -2)
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Based on these four assumptions, eight strategic objectives were identified for action
under the current MRJSP, two of which concerned EUC: 1) To establish a
standardized environment of tools, techniques, and EUC equipment, and 2) To develop
strategies to provide training and technical assistance to the end-user (MCBul 5271,
1989, pp.4-6,4-8).
a. Establishing a Standardized Environment of Tools, Techniques, and
EUC Equipment
(1) Problem
The MRISP notes the rapid advance of EUC over the past decade
and admits that standard policies and guidance have not kept pace. Additionally, a wide
variety of different hardware and software tools have been acquired. "This has resulted
in a substantial inventory of incompatible equipment and software." (MCBul 5271, 1989,
p.4-6)
(2) Strategy
The overall strategy for the solution of this problem has been a
strong centralization of the standards for hardware and software management and
acquisition (Bass, 1990, p.52). Lieutenant Colonel L. J. Sims, head of ADP acquisitions
at Headquarters Marine Corps has noted:
We probably have the best standardization program not only in the Defense
Department but probably in the whole federal government. (Bass. 1990. p. 52 )
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The agent for the development of a unified set of EUC standards is
a committee called the End-User Computer/Local Area Network (EUC/LAN) Working
Group. The EUC/LAN Work Group was formally chartered in January 1989 to replace
an earlier EUC/LAN Support Program Task Force (ACMC 5000/CS:005, 1989). The new
Work Group was established to
...support and assist the Director, C4 Division and the Head, CCI in the
development of standards and guidelines for acquiring and managing EUCE and
LAN's. (CMC 5230/CCIS-25, 1989)
This group is comprised of representatives of major commands who meet to decide issues
relating to EUC standardization (CMC 5230/CCIS-25, 1989). Since the group's
inception they have met twice. At the first meeting the Work Group chose a standardized
LAN operating system. At the second meeting they selected "Enable", an integrated word
processing, spreadsheet, and database management package as a standard Marine Corps
software package. (Bass., 1990, p.52 )
(3) Status of Effort
According to the MRISP, the objective of defining a standard
hardware and software environment for EUC within the Marine Corps has been attained
(MCBul 5271, 1989. p.4-6). The standards defined through the work of the EUC/LAN
Work Group coincided with an effort to standardize technical publications. An additional
factor noted by the MRISP that is leading toward a standardized EUC environment is the
compatibility of FMF-EUCE with Zenith microcomputers obtained through the Desktop
contracts.
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b. Providing Training and Technical Assistance to the End-User
(1) Problem
The amount of available training for end-users has not kept pace
with the rapid increase in technological breakthroughs in microcomputers. Not only has
the Marine Corps acquired a diverse assortment of hardware and software, the situation
has been further aggravated by a "...33 percent annual turnover in military personnel and
a relatively high turnover in civilian personnel ....". (MCBul 5271, 1989, p.4-8) The
MRISP notes that without well-educated users, the assets spent on equipment are not truly
cost-effective.
(2) Strategy
The MRISP does not provide a strategy to help meet this problem.
Rather, it summarizes the results of a study sponsored by the Marine Corps that American
Management Systems, Incorporated (AMS) performed in 1986. The major conclusions
of the study are:
(1) Most EUC training is provided locally and there is widespread availability of
EUC training.
(2) Local commands should develop annual training plans for the military and
civilian personnel.
(3) The Director, C4 Division and the Director, Training and Education Center
should develop recordkeeping standards to provide an accurate picture of who
received training, in what subjects and when in order to minimize duplicate or
unnecessary training and to better track training deficiencies.
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(4) The Marine Corps should develop an integrated EUC support network under the
cognizance of the Director, C4 Division to include: (a) MCCDPA-based mobile
training teams and information centers; (b) a Computer Sciences School (CSS)
based clearinghouse of EUC materials and programs; (c) CSS developed EUC
information letters; (d) CSS provided training in EUC support topics for
Occupational Field 40 personnel; (e) a formal interface between C4 Division, CSS,
and other formal schools; (f) C4 Division support for local users' groups; and (g)
regularly scheduled EUC conferences. (MCBul 5271, 1989, p.4-8)
(3) Status of Effort
The MRISP concludes by noting that the potential strategies
described by the AMS are being evaluated for eventual implementation. No timetable is
given.
In a slightly different vein, the MRISP addresses the updating of
technical publications as another way to help provide assistance in the EUC environment.
These technical publications give guidelines and "how-to" information in such basic areas
as introductory computer hardware and software concepts and progress through topics
including Information Centers, computer security and life cycle management. When
completely implemented and universally available, the technical publications will greatly
aid end-users. (Pierce, 1989)
4. Summaries of Plan Submissions
The final chapter of the MRISP contains a selection of the ADP problems most
cited by commands throughout the Marine Corps. Though these comments are not
directly relevant to thiz stated Marine Corps ADP/EUC strategy, they give a good
indication of how the Marine Corps in general feels about the current ADP situation.
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The MRISP ranked the ten maost frequently stated problems. Of those ten
problems, four of them dealt specifically with EUC: (1) the need to establish local and
base networks, (2) failure of EUC to meet requirements, (3) lack of EUC hardware and
software standards, and (4) the failure of user training to meet requirements. The MRISP
posited that the adoption of FMF-EUCE will do much to address the EUC problems
stated (MCBuI 5271, 1989, p.7-11). Further,
Information centers continue to be implemented to provide users with a central site
from which they may obtain training, IRM updates, procurement guidance,
programming support, and minor equipment maintenance support.. Training for end
users has begun throughout the Marine Corps and continues to grow through the
funher implementation and use of Information Centers. (MCBul 5271, 1989, pp.7-
5,7-7)
Finally, concern was expressed by major Fleet Marine Force (FMF)
commands:
ISMO T/O's must be increased if the ongoing surge in ADP capabilities is to be
maintained and supported (FMF Pacific).. The Marine Corps' first priority for ADP
support must be the FMF, not the Supporting Establishment. (FMF Atlantic)
(MCBul 5271, 1989, p.7-4)
The following sections examine more closely the issues raised here and the
validity of the rebuttals. Whatever the outcome of that examination, however, it is
encouraging to note that the two strategic objectives in the MRISP which overtly address
EUC are closely aligned with the concerns of Marine Corps users.
Having presented the doctrinal Marine Corps EUC strategy. the Marine
aviation squadron is now examined to find where it is placed within the various EUC
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models. Placement within the models will determine how well the doctrinal EUC strategy
is observed at the squadron level.
C. ALAVI, NELSON, WEISS MODEL
The model developed by Alavi et al. evaluates the organization in three areas:
policy setting and planning, support, and control to place it in one of five defined
strategie- It then describes a series of phases through which organizations pass and
prescribes a given strategy for each phase.
1. Marine Corps Policy Setting and Planning
'I ne MRISP delineates ongoing efforts to establish a standard set of policies
and guidelines for end-users. Particular emphasis has been placed on standardizing
software and hardware for the end-user. This has resulted in the adoption of a Marine
Corps de jure standard LAN configuration and a standard integrated software package.
However, interviews conducted with three ISC's and an ISMO indicate that the effect of
these changes on the aircraft group and squadron appear to be insignificant at this time.
(Molen, 1990, Osmer, 1990, Hatton, 1990, Thombs, 1990) The ISMO was aware of the
intent of the policies and the extent of the planning, but the ISC's were clearly less
informed. For example, none of the Marines interviewed at the group or squadron level
were aware of the existence of a Marine Corps EUC/LAN Working Group, a group
explicitly chartered to increase efficiency for the end-user.
ISCs interviewed expressed concern that Marine Corps orders governing EUC
are too vague to provide meaning to a lower-placed unit such as a squadron. (Molen,
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1990) Intermediate level organizations have filled the gap by providing specific guidance
to end-users that has not always serve the best interests of the end-users. One of the ISCs
cited the example of a directive from such an intermediate level dictating a push toward
laptop computers at a time when these computers could not perform applications required
in a squadron environment. The ISC interviewed believes that this intermediate level
decision was a distortion of a general Marine Corps directive. Because the directive was
vague, the laptop move was technically allowable. The end result was a policy which
hurt EUC at the squadron level. Major Osmer, the Third Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW)
ISMO, did point to the development of the technical publications described earlier as a
positive and helpful step in illuminating Marine Corps policies. Unfortunately, none of
the lower-echelon interviewees were aware of these publications.
From the point of view of the squadron, then, Marine Corps plans and policies
appear to be limited or understated. This perception of limited policy setting and
planning is indicative of a Laissez-faire strategy. Although in this case the Marine Corps
is rapidly developing formal standards and policies for EUC, indicative of a Monopolist
strategy, the vehicles for their dissemination and enforcement are not now in place. At
the squadron level this is tantamount to not having them at all.
2. Marine Corps EUC Support
The MRISP points to increased EUC support as one of the Marine Corps'
strategic objectives. A study sponsored by the Marine Corps points to "pockets of
educational support" throughout the Marine Corps, however with "...little coordination
among training providers." (MCBul 5271. 1989. p.4-8) These pockets are not distributed
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uniformly; not all sites interviewed had ready access to training. Major V. J. Thombs,
Administrative Officer and ISC for a helicopter squadron at MCAS New River states that
there is limited training available for Enable, but the training site is located at MCAS,
Cherry Point, some 40 miles away (Thombs, 1990). Training for MAG-39 Marines at
Camp Pendleton is provided by the First Force Service Support Group (FSSG), a non-
aviation organization at Camp Pendleton (Molen, 1990). This "good neighbor" policy of
providing resources across organizational boundaries is admirable, but can't and shouldn't
be depended upon. The needs of the providing organization necessarily come first, and
when assets become scarce, the providing organization will limit services provided
informally. At MCAS Tustin and at MCAS El Toro, training is available in beginning
MS-DOS and Enable. Major Osmer developed the program but complains that he is only
able to use facilities one week a month, training only twelve Marines per class. (Osmer,
1990)
The available training opportunities for squadron-level users are further
degraded by the amount of support available at the group level. The group ISC's
interviewed all wanted to help train the users at the squadron, but were seriously
understaffed and spent most of their time either reacting to malfunctioning systems or
working on the acquisition of new machines for squadrons. (Molen, 1990) The
interviewees expressed frustration at the lack of training of many squadron users. It was
felt that if squadron users had some basic training in operating systems and machine
operation, troubleshooting calls to the group ISC would lessen substantilly. (Molen,
1990) The group ISC could then concentrate on acquisition and ongoing training. This
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is clearly an ISC's dilemma: he or she spends too much time responding to simple
problems which occur as a direct result of little or no introductory computer training.
Consequently, time cannot be allocated to provide that training.
The amount of support provided to end-users in the Marine Corps is
representative of either a Laissez-faire or a Monopolist strategy. Both are characterized
by little support to the user. In the Laissez-faire strategy essentially no training is
provided, while in the Monopolist strategy training is ad hoc and limited to a defined
purpose by the controlling authority. That kind of direction at the lower level was not
observed in those squadrons and groups interviewed. Support strategy at the squadron
level therefore most closely resembles the Laissez-faire strategy.
3. Marine Corps Control
The aspect of control within an organization is tightly coupled with the policies
and plans of that organization. Control is the means to ensure that the plans and policies
are implemented.
It has already been shown that, although plans and policies have been and are
being formalized on a continuous basis, they don't seem to be "trickling down" to the
group and squadron level.
Control of squadron EUC assets is low for two main reasons. The first is that
the Marines in the best position to exert control, the group ISCs, are not sure of the
policies to be pursued. An example of this is the recent adoption of Enable as a software
standard for the Marine Corps. The Second MAW has directed that all users switch to
Enable (Thombs, 1990). On the West Coast, group ISCs at different bases interpreted the
61
adoption standard in two different ways. One saw it as impending and therefore not yet
to be enforced. The other saw it as a directive in place. (Molen, Hatton, 199U) None of
the interviewees, however, saw a truly effective way to enforce this effort at control.
A method of enforcing controls is to use a "watchdog" approach. This is not
currently feasible due to personnel limitations, and is the second reason why control is
not effective at the squadron level. The ISCs and ISMOs interviewed agreed that just
maintaining the status quo was difficult. (Molen, Hatton, Osmer, 1990) All would like
more assets. While this is a common theme in the Marine Corps, the magnitude of the
current IS undertaking would seem to indicate a need for additional resources. Lieutenant
Colonel L. D. Sims, in speaking of the adoption of Enable, notes that "...two-thirds of
the Marine Corps (emphasis by author) is going to have to change." (Bass, 1990, p.52)
Control, although portrayed by the MRISP as centralized and strong, is weak
by the time it reaches the users at the squadron level. Once again, this situation is
descriptive of a Laissez-faire strategy, where there are few controls. The depiction of
Marine Corps controls as weak is provocative in an organization that prides itself as
authoritarian. There are overt controls in place. As has been shown, this is an ongoing
Marine Corps trend, currently being aggressively pursued. The important point here,
however, is that if the controls do not reach the squadron, they may as well not have been
applied.
4. Conclusions
A dichotomy currently exists between what is depicted as the 'tate of EUC by
publications such as the NRISP, and what actually exists at the squadron level. This
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presents a condition which Alavi et al. do not describe: split strategies within an
organization. While Marine Corps policy makers feel that the Marine Corps EUC
situation is advanced, a substantial amount of the Marine Corps exists in a Laissez-faire
strategy, which is indicative of "...a null phase, or phase 0, due to the relative inactivity
along the dimensions of policy and planning, support, and control." (Alavi, Nelson, and
Weiss, 1987-88, p.44 ) The MRISP unwittingly fosters this split when it reports that the
Marine Corps favors centralized planning with decentralized operation. The concept
sounds good, but somewhere the plans and policies, control, and support developed by
the central planners are not reaching the users. The ongoing strategies and phases
presented by Alavi et al. are based on the premise that the organization knows which
strategy it is employing. For example, from a Laissez-faire strategy the organization
should move to an Acceleration strategy. If the organizational planners are not in touch
with their organization, however, they will not know that this is the prescribed direction
to take. This situation does not repudiate the model presented by Alavi et al. It does,
however, make the model harder to implement.
D. HUFF, MUNRO, ET AL. MODEL
The model for EUC analysis proposed by Huff, Munro, Martin, and Moore
examines EUC applications developed by an organization to place it in one of five stages
of growth: Isolation, Standalone, Manual Integration, Automated Integration, or
Distributed Integration. Within each stage an organization might find a different EUC
strategy appropriate. The strategies discussed closely resemble those of Alavi. Nelson.
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and Weiss. Huff, Munro, et al. categorize them as Laissez-faire, Acceleration, Controlled
Growth, or Containment. Each represents a different mixture of control and expansion.
1. Marine Corps EUC Applications Maturity
At the squadron level, EUC as represented by in-house developed applications
is in the Isolation Stage. This stage is characterized by the use of the microcomputer in
an "experimental" basis, and connotes little integration into the daily work routine. More
important, however, few applications are designed by the user for the enhancement of his
work. This is the largest indicator of the fact that the Marine Corps squadron is in the
Isolation Stage. The state of user education at the squadron level as described above has
resulted in too many users with a woeful lack of computer knowledge. Gunnery Sergeant
Molen notes that much of his job consists of making trouble calls for persistent, minor
problems such as improper computer or printer switch placement (Molen, 1990). With
Marines struggling to become proficient on pre-packaged applications, it is little wonder
that extensive EUC development is not occurring.
Even in the more-structured Green Machine environment, applications
development is proceeding in halting fashion (Osmer, 1990). Chapter Two highlighted
planning efforts in the early eighties to incorporate "Class IV" applications into an overall
library of applications. Aday and Pierce, in their thesis on the original IBM 4110 Green
Machine, noted that users complained that they didn't have enough knowledge and
training to perform Class IV programming (Aday and Pierce. 1982. p.53). Osmer notes
that there are efforts being made to compile the same applications library in 199)0 as was
supposedly available in 1982 (Osmer, 1990). If an aggressively pursued project such as
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the Green Machine has made so little progress, what will happen with the myriad of
microcomputers procured under the Desktop contracts?
The Marine Corps hopes to increase the interconnectivity of its microcomputer
assets by incorporation of LANs to the squadron level (Osmer, 1990). The adoption of
a standard network operating environment by the EUC/LAN Working Group has helped
to lay some of the groundwork for this project. The Third MAW is ,urrently working
aggressively to this end. Already LANs are in place down to the group level. (Osmer,
1990, Hatton, 1990, Molen, 1990) By linking all aviation assets via interconnected
LANs, a much higher degree of interconnectivity is possible. If successful, this network
system will move the Marine Corps into the Manual Integration Stage or even higher,
since information will be able to be passed via the network. With the benefits of such
a network apparent, it is logical to assume that more emphasis would be placed upon
becoming proficient. In short, there would be real incentive to learn the system and use
it.
There are mixed emotions about the incorporation of such a system. Major
D. R. Dempster, ISMO for the Second MAW in MCAS Cherry Point, notes that there will
be a tremendous savings in equipment costs by sharing servers and other peripheral
equipment with other local units (Dempster, 1989). On the West Coast Osmer feels a
great deal of apprehension about allowing users with the minimal knowledge of some
Marine users on a network. In an Isolation environment the potential for hurting one's
own machine and/or data is real, but contained. The danger to corporate data becomes
significant when unchpr-fd-dcatpd ;qn-r¢ are placed on a network. Security measures are
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available, but the "read-only" measures that protect data also prohibit effective retrieval
and editing, and consequently diminish the benefits of the prospective network. The local
network administrators would be drawn from the Group ISC ranks, many of whom have
little or no experience in such a role (Hatton, 1990). Molen is against the concept of
linking squadron computers at this time. Aside from the real training problem, he is still
facing a compatibility problem with his group's machines that must be resolved before
they can even be incorporated into a network. Many Zenith Z-120s still exist in his
group, which are not compatible with the later Z-248s. He is faced with pulling these Z-
120s for the sake of standardization with no available replacements. (Molen, 1990) One
step forward in this case may require quite a few back first.
2. Marine Corps EUC Strategy
As has been demonstrated in the earlier model, a dichotomy exists between the
strategy implemented at the squadron level and that dictated at Headquarters, Marine
Corps level. The ramifications of that split are more extreme in the Huff, Munro, et a!
model.
Headquarters, Marine Corps, by emphasizing rigid standards aid explicit
controls, manifests a Monopolist strategy. This is done with the express purpose of
"pushing" Marine Corps users into higher levels of competence, and in this model, into
interconnectivity and applications maturity. To that end, networks are being planned and
will be implemented. A mistake is being made however, if the assumption is that the
establishment of the system hardware is the hardest part of the initiative. Once the
system is in place it must be used, and used effectively. To do this, Marines must know
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what to do. If many cannot even use a computer effectively now, how will they fare in
a network environment? While it is true that the establishment of a network is a major
task that must be addressed, the education of the personnel to use and administer that
network effectively is a far more extensive task. Huff, Munro, et al. suggest that each
stage of connectivity will be attained by the use of a particular strategy. As in the earlier
model, they assume that everyone in the urganization is aware of the situation within the
organization.
3. Conclusions
Once again, the Marine Corps central planners appear to assume too much
expertise on the part of the users. The potential ramifications of this misunderstanding
are more extreme in the environment of interconnected microcomputers. Additionally,
while there has been a great deal of emphasis placed upon the adoption of a network,
there is little emphasis placed upon an environment that will encourage development of
applications suitable for the network. Little knowledge exists now for applications
development. What will happen when a network, with its learning time, is added to a
new software standard? The disjointed education and support environment now in place
is ill-prepared to meet this challenge.
While central planners are correct in wanting to move the Marine Corps
forward into more advanced stages of interconnection, issuing dictates is but the first step.
After that the ways to accomplish the dictates must be put in place. Education. support,
guidance; all are crucial to the success of the venture.
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E. GERRITY AND ROCKART MODEL
Gerrity and Rockart point to strategies such as Laissez-faire, Monopolist, and
Information Center (similar to Marketing) as having outlived their usefulness. They
suggest a Managed Free Economy as the end toward which to work. This strategy
consists of five key attributes: a stated end-user strategy, user/IS partnership,
targeting critical systems and applications, integrated support organizations, and an
emphasis on education throughout the organization.
1. Stated End-user Strategy
A stated strategy helps those, particularly at the lower levels, "look beyond the
trees" and get a feeling for why a direction is being taken and how to take it. One of the
biggest complaints of those at the lower levels is a lack of this stated direction. (Molen,
1990) While many see the advantages of ADP support for the squadron (Thombs, 1990),
there is a "disconnect" between the strides being taken from above (e.g., standardizing
software) and the actual needs of the lower-level units (e.g., hardware support, software
and basic machine training, etc.)
2. User/IS Partnership
Explicit in the concept of a User/IS partnership is the notion that users should
help develop the tools that will make them more productive. This could include the
choice of machines and software, as well as joint development of standards designed to
form a framework for effective utilization of those devices.
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The Marine Corps appears to have made a commitment to this end when they
adopted an EUC/LAN Working Group comprised of representatives from organizational
units throughout the Marine Corps. Further, when agenda topics were chosen, active
effort was made to gather data from the FMF at large for discussion at meetings. A
prime example of this was the dissemination of a message throughout the Marine Corps
seeking an inventory of software used in the lowest levels of the Marine Corps prior to
evaluating alternatives for a standard software package. (CMC/CCIR 210033Z JUL 89)
ISCs interviewed, however, had not heard of the Working Group. Although
they had participated in the Corps-wide software inventory they stated that they were not
aware of its purpose. (Molen, 1990, Hatton, 1990) A group chartered to help users would
be a powerful public relations mechanism in and of itself. It seems curious that this
Working Group is not more widely known, at least among ISCs. A more troubling aspect
of the Group is its constituency. Major Osmer made the following personal notes after
the EUC/LAN Working Group had met to determine a software standard:
The original EUC/LAN working Group charter had proposed that 14 FMF
commands (3 MEFs, 3 DIVs, 3 FSSGs, 3 MAWs, FMFPac and FMFLant), 3
Reserve commands, and 15 Supporting Establishment (SE) commands (HQMC,
MCCDC. 2 MCRDs, 2 COMCABs, 3 MCCDPAs, and 6 MCBs) could vote.
However, when the charter was signed by BGen McKay, only 5 FMF commands
(3 MEFs, FMFPac and FMFLant), 1 Reserve command, and 10 SE commands
(HQMC, MCRDAC, 3 MCCDPAs, and 3 MCBs) could vote. It is my opinion,
FMF commands will eventually suffer on future standardization efforts. (Osmer (A),
1989)
It is highly unlikely that a professional ADP Marine in a mainframe-oriented Support
Establishment would be able to understand and empathize with the problems of an FMF
unit at the squadron level. Moreover. the charter of the Working Group is clear: each
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representative is to present and voice the concerns of the organization to which he or she
belongs. This shift away from the concerns of the FMF is difficult to understand, and
appears to proceed counter to the spirit of the Working Group charter. It certainly does
not develop the concept of a team effort between IS and the user from the FMF point of
view.
3. Targeting Critical Systems and Applications
A proactive strategy to help users identify critical systems and aid in their
development is one of the more pronounced examples of a User/IS team. The Marine
Corps is endeavoring to develop systems to help the user. Probably the best example of
this is the adoption and incorporation of networks throughout the Marine Corps to
facilitate reporting requirements. As has been mentioned earlier, however, the effort is
system-oriented, with end-user support and education having a relatively low priority in
the development process. While there are plans in place to provide administration for the
networks, the lack of computer knowledge at the squadron level to handle such a system
is causing consternation for ISCs and ISMOs (Molen, 1990, Osmer, 1990). While a
concerted effort to develop applications has not been documented, the pressure for the
formation of applications libraries for Green Machine applications has been renewed
(Osmer, 1990).
4. Integrated Support Organization
The ISMO and ISC were created to help facilitate the incorporation of the
Green Machine into the Marine Corps. They have remained during the initiation of
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microcomputer use and are now an integral part of the support for the end-user. The
number of ISMO Marines has, in some cases, increased to help provide support. ISMOs
and ISCs interviewed do not feel that they are adequately staffed to meet the needs of
education, support, control, and administration. (Molen, 1990, Osmer, 1990) Further, the
ISCs at group and in the squadrons do not generally receive any formal training prior to
their accession as the local ADP expert. (Osmer, 1990)
5. Education Throughout the Organization
The theme of user education has surfaced consistently throughout this thesis,
and looms as a very large problem. Headquarters, Marine Corps feels strongly enough
about this problem that it has identified the development of training strategies as a
strategic objective, and has sponsored a related study. The adoption of standard software
will help ease the problem, but learning the system initially, receiving support, and
training replacements requires an ongoing training program.
6. Conclusions
The Marine Corps has taken great strides toward the adoption of many of the
attributes which Gerrity and Rockart feel are important. Many of the directions, however,
are chosen from the standpoit of the central, non-FMF unit. This divorce from the FMF
end-user helps perpetuate the myth that the end-user is computer-literate, well-supported
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and is aligned with corporate information policies. In order to satisfy the five attributes
described by Gerrity and Rockart, the perceptions of the users must be used as the
ultimate gauge of success.
F. EUSKE AND DOLK MODEL
Euske and Dolk assert that control of information resources within an organization
is characteristically bureaucratically-imposed. Given a computer-literate user base, this
situation can migrate either to a condition where unspoken norms govern the EUC actions
of the users, or ultimately to a state where EUC controls are blended seamlessly into the
organization itself.
One of their central themes is the notion that users can control their own use of
EVC. In a rapidly-changing environment, bureaucratic controls over a large organization
with few controlling agents is bound to be ineffective. Unfortunately. the aitematives that
Euske and Dolk present stand little chance of being adopted, largely because of thb,
inexperience among the user base in general. What is left, then, is overt, bureaucratically-
imposed guidelines. The Marine Corps operates primarily in a bureaucratic mode. and
most l;.'zely will stay there for quite some time to come.
G. SUMMARY
This chapter has examined EUC in the Marine Corps from the perspective of four
mode,!i. In the Alavi, Nelson, et al. model conditions at the squadron leel ae indictat.e
of a Laissez-faire Strategy. Although explicit tandard iund ,iitrolk ue he iv
,leveloped. little changes have occurred foi Marines at relativelx low level, ;vithin the
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Marine Corps. This analysis revealed a dichotomy in Marine Corps EUC management.
Cenual auhorities appear to favor a strong, Monopolist Strategy, but the low level users
do not feel its effect. A split was observed in the Huff, M,,_-ro, et al. model as well.
Although the squadron-level Marines appeared to be in the Isolation Stage of their
model, central authorities are seeking to provide the impetus to move to greater levels of
interconnectivity by the imposition of a Marine Corps-wide series of networks. Although
these networks may ultimately benefit all, central authorities do not foresee the danger
of an under-educated user population in a sophisticated network system. The Marine
Corps shows strong positive growth in the five attributes which Gerrity and Rockart feel
are critical to successful EUC strategy. In this model as well, however, decisions crucial
to the development of lower level users are being made without the input of the users
themselves. Means to derive this input, such as the EUC/LAN Working Group, are
focusing on higher-level. Supporting Establishment agenda, to the possible detriment of
squadron-level, FMF Marines.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The questions that guided the research effort of this thesis are again listed here in
conjunction with the conclusions drawn during the course of the study. Specific
recommendations for the Marine Corps are presented, and areas for future research are
suggested.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
" What is the stated strategy for end-user computing development within the Marine
Corps?
" Does the Marine Corps' main information resource management planning document
(the Mid-Range Information Systems Plan) accurately depict the current EUC
situation at the small unit level?
" Does the current Marine Corps EUC strategy provide for effective growth at the
small unit level?
* How do current EUC conditions at the small unit level in the Marine Corps
compare to models found in the literature'?
" Is the current EUC organizational structure within the Marine Corps adequate to
meet the needs of users throughout the Marine Corps?
" How are end-users at the small unit level trained and supported?
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" How can users be better trained?
" What changes should be made in strategy (and) structure to facilitate effective EUC
utilization in the Marine Corps?
C. CONCLUSIONS
1. Marine Corps EUC Strategy
The strategy that the Marine Corps has developed for EUC use is the same
type of strategy that it has successfully used in the mainframe environment and with the
ADPE-FMF. This "centralized policy making combined with decentralized operations"
approach has resulted in some success in the EUC area, chiefly in the acquisition of
hardware and software products for squadron users.
The real issue is whether the Marine Corps' strategy has fostered and
encouraged growth of EUC in the Marine Corps. Based upon interviews with squadron
and group-level Marines, it appears that little progress is being made, or at least the
progress being made is not at a rate commensurate with the acquisition rate of EUC
machinery.
The EUC models examined in this thesis all emphasized the need for an
explicit EUC strategy which the users know and understand. Analysis of the Marine
Corps within these models revealed a split between the perception enunciated by central
Marine Corps authorities and that at the squadron end-user level. This split has occurred
because the central planners do not have enough input from the low-level users.
Consequently the plans and policies are either unacceptable or unintelligible to the users.
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The dichotomy between the strategic state of the low-level EUC population and
Marine Corps central planrners is one of the two biggest problems facing EUC in the
Marine Corps. Because of this problem, many opportunities available in a highly
proactive Marine Corps environment are not being realized to their fullest potential. The
most immediate example is the work of the EUC/LAN Working Group. This committee
is doing a significant amount of constructive work. The lack of adequate representation
by the FMF in this Group is a serious flaw, and may cause poor decisions in the future.
2. Training
There is a significant problem with EUC training at the squadron level in the
Marine Corps. This is partially caused by the decentralization of all functions, including
education, to the lowest levels. Wing ISMOs are aware of the problem and are dealing
with it. They do not have the resources available to provide useful and comprehensive
training to their geographically-distributed areas of responsibility. The result has been a
reliance on the ISC to come up with a plan of his own. While the group ISCs
interviewed have recognized the problem and have found a method of training, this catch-
as-catch-can approach is far too reliant on the individual personality. When the
individuals themselves are not trained ADP professionals, this approach is extremely
risky.
There is no quantifiable evidence that the lack of training and the subsequent
low ADP education level of squadron Marines has hindered growth. Based on the
individuals interviewed, however, a cause and effect relationship is believed to exist.
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A larger problem than the relatively slow acceptance of EUC looms in the
future if plans for sophisticated interlinked networks continue with the state of user
education at its present level. Users do not currently know enough to use the proposed
system effeciently, nor are they aware of the vast benefits it can bring. This situation is
the worst consequence of a central planning organization out of touch with its users.
3. Organizational Aspects
The central planning structure within Headquarters, Marine Corps has taken
a great interest in the development of EUC in the Marine Corps, and has provided
outstanding service in areas identified as needing attention. The establishment of software
standards, the establishment of an EUC work group and the need for acquisition
streamlining procedures serve as examples of an efficient, beneficial organization. ISMOs
aid ISCs theoretically provide for a two-way flow of information with the end-user.
There is a breakdown, however, at the lower levels. This is primarily because of the
nuiniber of available staff and the staff's lack of ADP background. If one is going to
employ a decentralized operations policy, appropriately staffed and trained organizations
must be fielded to perform those decentralized operations. This is currently not the case
in the Marine Corps. As long as this condition exists, problems associated with the
discrepancy between technology and the end-user knowledge base will continue to
develop and multiply.
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4. The Mid-Range Information Systems Plan
The MRISP is both a plan and a historical document. It should tell central
authorities what the users feel are pressing matters while it enunciates to the users how
those matters will be incorporated into an overall strategy. The document reviewed in
this thesis contains all of the information but it is, in certain cases regarding EUC,
contradictory. The lack of a global training and education strategy is noted as an
objective that has not been achieved, but the adoption of Corps-wide Information Centers
is inferred later in the document. A small but significant portion of the document
publishes comments from Marine Corps units. Submissions from both major FMF
commands remind the reader of the primacy of FMF operations in the Marine Corps. The
fact that these statements are made overtly casts doubt on the universal acceptance of
EUC implied in the MRISP, and tend to corroborate the fears of Major Osmer regarding
FMF representation in the EUC/LAN Work Group.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Emphasize EUC Education and Support
The Marine Corps is doing much work to provide adequate standards and
policies to the end-user. Unfortunately, the means for emplacing and enforcing those
standards and policies are not in place. The best way to ensure the use of a particular
standard is to provide support for it. This will ensure compliance to standards while it
develops EUC as a whole.
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The AMS study provided a complete list of potential training strategies. The
important next step is to implement them. Much is made of the decreased training
required because of software standards. However, little has been said to date of the
training required to establish the knowledge base, nor of the necessity to fill the gaps
caused by normal and unplanned attrition, both civilian and Marine.
2. Implement Information Centers At All Bases
The implementation of ICs across the Marine Corps is the best way to
accomplish the very two objectives which the MRISP has identified of enforcing
standardized practices and providing education. By providing training to ISCs to run the
IC, central planners are ensuring that the message which they want to send is being
received at the lowest level. A further benefit is the real link between planners and users.
There will definitely need to be an increase in resources to implement these
ICs. The largest resource increase will be the Marines to run the ICs. ISCs are clearly
too busy to run them entirely on their own. They will need help, particularly at the
beginning. However, after the ICs establish a baseline for user knowledge, the ISC
should become less encumbered by his present troubleshooting calls. Adequate classroom
facilities exist at most bases, although shortages undoubtedly will occur. The Marine




3. Evaluate Central/Distributed Responsibilities
It has been shown that there is an important, legitimate requirement for central
guidance in plotting EUC direction and ensuring its success. In the Marine Corps, the
division of responsibilities has, in certain cases, hindered efforts to enhance EUC.
A central planning effort is required to adequately utilize the disparate means
available for training. Universities, trade schools and different organizations are available
at local levels to aid in the training, Each geographical area will have different meas
to use tht training environments, based upon availability. It is crucial that central
assistance be provided to optimize these local resources for the training and support of
Marine users. Once the plan is in place, local ISCs can implement it.
To ensure that these responsibilities are being met, both by central authorities
and local users, adequate lines of communication must be developed and utilized. The
Marine Corps has such lines constructed as witnessed by the M.RISP, the ISC-ISMO
offices, and the formation of the EUC/LAN Working Group. The importance of two-way
communication must be emphasized to ensure that there is a proper delegation and
assumption of authority.
4. Emphasize the Information Systems Coordinator
It is assumed that in the foreseeable future constraints on the number of
professional ADP specialists available will prohibit their large scale integration into the
FMF Barring this, there must be trained Marines available for consultation and training.
ISCs are ideal for this role. In order to properly exercise their responsibilities. however.
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they must be suitably prepared to assume the job. ISCs at the group level at a minimum
must receive formal training, preferably at the Computer Scieni.es School at Quantico,
Virginia.
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
During the course of this study it became apparent that the Marine Corps is in a
state of transition regarding its treatment of EUC. The objectives of the MRISP and the
establishment of the EUC/LAN Work Group point to a need for change. Also, just from
a cursory look at the state of EUC in the FMF it is apparent that there is a great deal of
disparity in the state of maturity in different organizations. The following recommended
topics follow generally from these two observations.
• Describe and evaluate plans for comprehensive EUC education plans in the Marine
Corps.
" Perform a survey of EUC maturity across different combat specialties (e.g., air
versus ground, etc.)
" Perform a survey of EUC maturity across different organizational strata within the
same combat specialty (e.g., squadron versus wing levels)
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